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Abstract Empirical work shows that a considerable fraction of firms quit the
export market soon after entrance. A natural interpretation to this quick exit
from the export market is that firms did not predict the profitability of their
variety correctly before entry. In this paper a firm heterogeneity model is
put forward to account for this type of exporting uncertainty due to lack of
information. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to the popularity of their
good, technically the CES weight, and the popularity of a good varies across
markets. Therefore, firms are uncertain about the profitability of their good
in the export market. Upon payment of sunk export costs the popularity of
the good is revealed and some firms stay in the export market while others
leave. Comparative statics show that lower sunk export costs lead to higher
probability that firms start to export, but to lower probability of export success.
Lower fixed export costs instead lead to both a higher probability to start
exporting and to be successful in exporting.
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Empirical work shows that a significant fraction of firms quit the export
market soon after entrance. Bernard and Jensen (2004) report that 15% of the
exporting firms leave the export market every year in a sample of American
firms between 1984 and 1992. Almost 5% of the firms have left the export
market already the year after entry and do not return again on the export
market afterwards (calculations from Table 5 of Bernard and Jensen 2004).
Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006) find that 16% of the exporting firms leave
the export market every year in a sample of Chilean firms between 1990 and
1996. They do not calculate which fraction of quitters from the export market
had just entered the export market. Other evidence on quick exit can be found
in Eaton et al. (2007). They show in a panel of Colombian firms between 1996
and 2005 where each single export transaction is recorded that ‘the survival
rate among first-year exporters is typically around one-third, and in some
cases is much lower (Eaton et al. 2007, p. 19).’ Hence two-third of the starting
exporters drop out within a year. Indirect evidence on the quick exit of firms
from the export market after entry comes from duration analysis on detailed
export categories. Besedes and Prusa (2006) show with a US dataset between
1992 and 2001 of detailed product categories that around one third of imports
(depending on the data) in a product category for differentiated products stop
again within 1 year. Nitsch (2007) finds in a sample of German imports between
1995 and 2005 that 40% of the newly emerging import product categories stop
within 1 year.1
So, empirical evidence shows that there is a lot of exit from the export
market shortly after entry. Broadly, two reasons for exit from the export
market can be identified. On the one hand, variables affecting profitability
in the export market display variation. Negative shocks to such variables can
induce firms to drop out of the export market. Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin
and Krugman (1989) for example model fluctuations in exchange rates. Their
model shows that sunk export costs lead to persistent trade effects of exchange
rate shocks. Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2006) make productivity a stochastic
process in a Melitz-type model of trade to explain that firms can leave the
export market again after entrance.
On the other hand, firm exit from the export market can be due to the fact
that firms simply do not have (enough) information about profitability in the
export market. The model presented in this paper follows this view. Firms
cannot assess the popularity of their good in the export market before they
enter the export market. After entrance, the popularity of their good could be
too low to produce profitably. An example of this type of exporting uncertainty
1These studies correct for censoring as a result of redefining product categories. As these data are
on product categories, the hazard rates are a lower bound for the hazard rates for individual firms
given that more firms could trade in one product category. On the other hand continuing exports
of a certain variety could be recorded as exit from a product category when firms switch product
categories with their variety.
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is the withdrawal of Wal-Mart from the German and South-Korean export
market. After a presence of some years on these foreign markets incurring
huge losses, Wal-Mart gathered enough information to realize that their
‘product-type’ was not popular enough in these foreign markets. Nguyen
(2008) also follows an approach where firms drop out of the export market
after they get to know their profitability on the export market. The difference
is that in our model firms get to know their profitability by incurring sunk entry
costs, whereas in Nguyen (2008) firms get information about their profitability
by selling in the foreign market. Below there is a comparison of the approach
in Nguyen (2008) and in the current paper.
The model in this paper is a firm heterogeneity model (in the spirit of Melitz
2003) taking into account exporting uncertainty. There is heterogeneity in the
taste parameter (the CES-weight) of a variety instead of in productivity and
the taste parameters of the same variety are different in the domestic and
exporting market. Firms are uncertain about the popularity of their good,
reflected in the taste parameter, before they start producing ánd before they
start exporting. Sunk costs have to be paid to learn the popularity of the
good both in the domestic and exporting market. The economic literature
provides ample evidence for the existence of sunk export costs (See for
example Baldwin and Krugman 1989; Roberts and Tybout 1997; Das et al.
2007; Albarran et al. 2009). In a survey study of exporting firms in the UK,
(Kneller and Pisu 2008) find that firms report market exploration costs as
an important barrier to trade. In particular, 26% of the firms that started
exporting mention ‘obtaining basic information about an export market’ and
41% mention ‘the marketing costs of doing business in an overseas market’ as
a barrier to trade. Hence, sunk export costs consist (partly) of market research
costs.
Differences in taste parameters have a more natural interpretation than
differences in productivity: preferences are different across countries. It is
assumed that the taste parameters on the different markets correlate, albeit
imperfectly. The correlation between taste parameters is a function of the
cultural proximity between countries. Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) show in
empirical work that a higher level of cultural proximity leads to higher levels
of trade through a larger similarity of preferences.2
The model’s solution contains an additional endogenous variable, the cutoff
taste parameter below which a firm does not consider exporting. A firm with a
taste parameter above this cutoff value starts exporting but can be unsuccessful
when its product is not popular enough on the foreign market. This drives the
exporting uncertainty. The model generates three cutoff taste parameters, a
domestic cutoff taste parameter, a cutoff taste parameter to start exporting
and a cutoff taste parameter to be successful in exporting.
2As discussed in Section 3, we can generalize the setup and make firms heterogeneous in both
taste parameter and productivity. This implies that the sunk entry costs would also consist partly
of costs to find out the costs of production abroad.
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The effects of changes in the different types of trade costs display interesting
patterns. The effect of lower iceberg trade costs is as expected: the domestic
cutoff value increases, whereas both exporting cutoff levels decrease. But the
effects of lower sunk export costs and of lower fixed export costs are different
on the two exporting cutoff values. Lower sunk export costs decrease the
cutoff level to start exporting and raise the cutoff level for successful exporting,
whereas lower fixed export costs decrease the cutoff level to start exporting
and the cutoff level for successful exporting. The implication is that both lower
sunk and fixed export costs lead to a higher probability that a firm will start
exporting. But lower sunk export costs decrease the probability of success
in the export market, whereas lower fixed export costs raise the probability
of successful entry into the export market. The different effect of changes in
sunk and fixed export costs on the success rate of exporting can be explained
as follows: lower sunk export costs do not affect operational profits from
exporting. Therefore, they raise the cutoff level to be successful in exporting
to restore the ex ante free entry condition. Still, because of the lower sunk
export costs it becomes attractive for more firms to try to start exporting.
The result is that more firms start exporting, but the hurdle to be successful
is higher. Therefore, the success rate declines. With lower fixed export costs
instead the operational profits from exporting rise. Therefore, the cutoff level
to be profitable in exporting declines. The cutoff level to start exporting also
declines, but the effect on cutoff level for successful exporting is so large that
of the larger number of firms that start exporting also more firms will be
successful.
The different types of trade costs are a function of different types of trade
barriers. Therefore, the derived comparative statics have implications for the
effect of changing various types of trade barriers. Iceberg trade costs are a
function of tariffs and per unit nontariff barriers. Fixed export costs are related
to the regulatory burden of trade that appear each period like the costs of
complying with customs procedures, acquiring licenses to import. Sunk export
costs are a function of the regulatory burden of trade facing an exporter when
starting to export, like collecting information on import procedures.
The welfare effects of lower trade costs are for all three types of trade costs
positive. This is remarkable for a decrease in sunk export costs, as they make
entrance into the export market more probable, whereas success in the export
market becomes less likely. Hence, more resources are dissipated in the entry
process. The welfare effect is still positive, because in a Melitz type of model
a higher demand for resources, also if used ‘non-productively,’ is the driving
force for a welfare increase. It bids up real wages and squeezes thereby the
least productive firms out of the market leading to higher average welfare.
The policy conclusion is that programs to stimulate entrepreneurs to focus on
foreign markets by helping them in dealing with regulations, procedures and
information problems when starting to export do have positive welfare effects.
And the welfare effects are also positive if a large fraction of the firms that
start exporting do not succeed.
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This paper contributes to the literature on models with both exporting
uncertainty and firm heterogeneity. Crozet et al. (2007) model uncertainty
about the political environment to explain that less productive firms who were
‘lucky’ not to face bribes can enter a market whereas certain more productive
firms cannot. In the already mentioned work of Irarrazabal and Opromolla
(2006) firms’ productivities are a stochastic process. Some exporting firms will
have to leave the exporting market because their productivity experienced a
negative shock. Finally, there is structural estimation empirical work proving
the importance of sunk export costs where firms are heterogeneous and
face shocks to various variables (see for example Roberts and Tybout 1997;
Das et al. 2007).
The paper differentiates itself from these other models by starting from the
view that uncertainty is due to a lack of information on exporting profitability.
There is ample empirical evidence that both sources of uncertainty, lack of
information on, and shocks to, variables affecting profitability are important.
Firm level data show that a considerable fraction of exit from the export
market is shortly after entry, although estimates differ across studies. Also, not
only firms that leave the export market immediately after entrance are support
for the approach in this paper. Firms can stay in the market for some years
before they know whether their product is popular enough and whether they
can be profitable (firms could incur losses in a foreign market for some years
until they are convinced they cannot be profitably like the Wal-Mart example
mentioned). Moreover, data on duration of detailed export categories show
that a large fraction of export flows become zero quickly after entry.
This paper is also related to the literature on the role of networks in trade.
Rauch and Watson (2003) propose a model where buyers are involved in costly
search for potential importers. After being matched with an importer they get
to know the cost of the importer. They can either buy a small amount from the
importer generating zero surplus or invest a lump-sum amount to get to know
whether the importer can process a large order. If the answer is yes a larger
surplus from trade can be generated. The model by Rauch and Watson (2003)
can also explain a large fraction of exiting firms from the export market soon
after entry. The model proposed below is similar. An important difference is
that in the model below sellers take the initiative to try and sell a product
profitably, whereas in Rauch and Watson (2003) buyers approach possible
importers. Another difference is that in the model below, exports will be larger
to countries that are culturally closer having more similar preferences, whereas
in Rauch and Watson (2003) exports to countries with closer business ties and
denser networks will be larger.3
3Guiso et al. (2004) fits into the view put forward by Rauch and Watson (2003). They show that
cultural proximity increases the amount of trade between two countries through an increase in
levels of trust between people of the two countries. Unfortunately, they do not address the possible
effect of cultural proximity through similarity of tastes.
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Rauch (1999) dismisses a type of model similar to the one in the present
paper where producers produce varieties that are most popular in the home
market and their popularity in other markets declines with (cultural) distance.
He puts forward two pieces of evidence. First, he shows that a dummy for
colonial ties between countries raises trade whereas a dummy for common
language has hardly a significant effect. In his reading colonial ties proxy busi-
ness ties whereas a common language proxies similar tastes. This implies that
the empirical evidence supports the network view in his work and dismisses
the tastes view in the present paper. But it is disputable whether business ties
are exclusively proxied by colonial ties whereas similar tastes are exclusively
proxied by common language. A common language also eases business ties and
colonial ties are likely to lead to more similar tastes as well as to more intense
business ties.
Second, he refers to a study by Gould (1994) who finds that immigration into
the USA raises bilateral trade with the country of origin of the immigrants. The
effect is stronger on exports from the USA than on imports, however, favoring
a network view over a shared tastes view. But this evidence does not prove
that the shared tastes view is not important. Indeed (Felbermayr and Toubal
2010) use empirical evidence to show that cultural proximity of countries raises
trade both because this leads to lower trade costs (implying closer business ties
emphasized by Rauch 1999) and because it implies more similar tastes. Hence,
both channels seem to be important.
The work by Nguyen (2008) is similar to the current paper. Nguyen (2008)
also proposes a model of firm heterogeneity in popularity with different
although correlated popularity across markets. The main difference with the
current paper is that in Nguyen (2008) firms learn their popularity in a market
by selling one period, whereas in the current paper firms get to know their
popularity by incurring sunk entry costs. Two distinct empirical literatures are
useful in comparing these two approaches. First, the international management
literature on strategies to enter export markets provides support for both
approaches. As discussed by Dana (2006) the early literature on exporting
strategies stresses the gradual approach to exporting, also dubbed the Uppsala
process model. Firms gradually commit more resources to the export market
as they acquire experiential knowledge being active in foreign markets. This
model of foreign market entry fits into the theory of Nguyen (2008). But
some papers cast doubt about the gradual approach and argue that firms
move quickly into export markets leapfrogging stages of internationalization
by investing large sums of money at the initial stage of entry into the export
market, see for example (Hedlund and Kverneland 1985; Millington and
Bayliss 1990).
Second, several papers provide strong evidence for the existence of sunk
costs of exporting, for example (Baldwin and Krugman 1989; Roberts and
Tybout 1997; Das et al. 2007). In particular, these papers show that firms
exporting in the previous year are much more likely to export the current
year, holding constant other factors. This implies that new entrants have lower
expected profits than incumbents, because they have to incur sunk costs in
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their first year of exporting. This empirical finding is difficult to reconcile with
a model of learning through exporting without sunk costs like (Nguyen 2008).
If firms have correct priors before starting to export, the probability to be in
the export market will be independent of export presence in the previous year.
Like Nguyen (2008) also Eaton et al. (2008) and Albornoz et al. (2010)
propose a model of learning through exporting to provide an explanation for
(among others) the fact that a large fraction of exporting firms leaves the
exporting market shortly after entry. But the focus of these papers is more
on the growth dynamics of exporters after entry.
The next section points out preferences, demand, revenues and profits and
solves the closed economy model. Section 3 solves the open economy model.
Section 4 outlines the effects of changes in different types of trade costs.
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Closed economy
Assume that all goods in the economy belong to the differentiated goods
sector. There is a mass of consumers L with an equal CES utility function with














Raising the CES weight αv to the power 1/σ is an innocuous assumption. It will
turn out to be computationally convenient later on. There is only one factor of
production, labor, and the wage is normalized at 1. Therefore, the demand
facing a firm is given by:
xv = Lcv = αv p−σv Pσ−1L (2)








Production is increasing returns with a fixed cost of production. There is one
factor of production, labor. Wages are normalized at 1 and it is assumed that
productivity is homogeneous.4 The cost function depends upon marginal costs
a and fixed costs f and is given by:
C (xv) = axv + f (4)
4This can be generalized, making marginal costs dependent on the CES-weight, like in Baldwin
and Harrigan (2007). But such a generalization would not add anything to the analysis and would
not change the main results. Therefore, for computational simplicity the marginal cost is kept equal
across firms.
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A firm can only start to produce when it has incurred sunk entry costs fe.
Paying these sunk costs reveals a firm’s taste parameter αv . This seems a more
natural interpretation of the sunk entry costs than in Melitz (2003). Firms have
to explore the desirability of their product in the market and this requires
sunken investments.
The pricing equation of a firm is independent from the taste parameter:
pv = σ
σ − 1a
Revenues and profits of a firm do depend on the taste parameter:






π (αv) = r (αv)
σ
− f (6)
Immediately after entry firms decide whether to stay in business or not. When
they can make positive profit they stay, otherwise they exit immediately. The
taste parameter value at which they are just indifferent about producing is the
cutoff taste parameter α∗. Producing firms have a fixed death probability δ
each period. Entrants draw from an initial distribution of taste parameters
G (α). The truncated distribution of taste parameters of producing firms
follows from this initial distribution:5
μ (α) = 1
1 − G (α∗)g (α) (7)
With this expression the average taste parameter from Eq. (10) can be ex-





1 − G (α∗)
∞∫
α∗
αg (α) dα (8)
The price index can be expressed as a function of the average taste parameter







= pN 11−σ a˜ 11−σ (9)




αμ (α) dα (10)
μ (α) is the distribution density of taste parameters of producing firms. Note
that variables with a ~ are averages conditional upon successful entry.
5As Melitz (2003) points out in footnote 13, the equilibrium truncated distribution follows from
the distribution of initial productivities applying the law of large numbers.
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In equilibrium a zero cutoff profit condition (ZCP) and a free entry con-




) = 0 (11)
The ZCP can be rewritten as a function of average profit and the cutoff taste
parameter:





r (˜α) = σ (π (˜α) + f )
⎫⎬







Note that profit and revenue of the firm with average taste parameter are equal
to average profit and average revenue. The FE is given by:
π˜ = δ fe
1 − G (α∗) (13)
The equilibrium cutoff taste parameter is found by combining the ZCP, the
FE and the definition for the average taste parameter, Eqs. (12), (13) and (8)
respectively and the proof of existence of a unique equilibrium for α∗ and π˜
from the ZCP and FE is fully analogous to Melitz (2003).
There is a stationary equilibrium with the mass of entering firms equal to
the mass of dying firms.6 The mass of successful entrants in each period is
equal to (1 − G (α∗)) Ne, with Ne the mass of (successful and unsuccessful)
entrants. The mass of dying firms is equal to δN with N the number of
firms producing. In stationary equilibrium, (1 − G (α∗)) Ne = δN. Labor can
be used in production, indicated by Lp, or in the development of new varieties,
indicated by Le. Using the stationary equilibrium condition and the free entry
condition, implies the following expression for Le:
Le = Ne fe = δN fe1 − G (α∗) = Nπ˜
The payments to labor in production, Lp, are equal to aggregate revenues
minus aggregate profits, Lp = Nr˜ − Nπ˜ . Hence, adding Lp and Le implies that
aggregate revenues are equal to the size of the labor force, L = Lp + Le = N
r˜. The mass of firms N can be solved from the solution for average profit
following from the ZCP and FE, Eqs. (12) and (13), using N = L/(π˜ + σ f ).
3 Open economy model
To model the open economy, uncertainty in the exporting decision is included.
To this end, the taste parameter abroad is assumed to be different from
6Working with a mass of firms implies a stationary equilibrium with all aggregate variables
(price index, aggregate revenues) staying constant over time. With a discrete number of firms
the equilibrium would wander around, see for discussion (Bekkers and Francois 2010).
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the taste parameter domestically.7 So, success on the domestic market is no
guarantee for success on the foreign market. Empirically this is important as
many firms leave the foreign market shortly after they entered it. The foreign
taste parameter is assumed to be related to the domestic taste parameter in the
following way:
αFv = βαHv + εv (14)
εv is a random variable with mean 0 and variance σ 2ε . 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. When σε = 0
uncertainty disappears. The superscripts H and F indicate home and foreign
variables respectively. According to Eq. (14) popularity in the domestic market
tells something about popularity on the foreign market, but not everything.
The value of β can be seen as a measure for ‘psychic distance,’ a concept
from the marketing literature. Psychic distance is an indicator of for example
differences in language, consumer behavior and cultural standards between
markets (Stoettinger and Schlegelmilch 1998). Equivalently it can be seen as a
measure for ‘cultural proximity,’ a similar concept as psychic distance applied
in Felbermayr and Toubal (2010). These authors show that countries that are
culturally more proximate trade more because trade costs are lower, but also
because preferences are more similar.
The remaining assumptions on the open economy keep the economy as
simple as possible. There are two countries, the distribution of taste parameters
is equal in both countries and the size of the economy is equal to ensure equal
wages. There are three types of export costs, iceberg trade costs τ , fixed (per
period) export costs fx and sunk export costs fex. The sunk export costs are
paid when a firm starts exporting. The fixed export costs are paid each period
by producing firms.
Without exporting uncertainty, like in Melitz (2003) for example, either the
sunk export costs or the fixed export costs would be redundant. Each firm that
enters the export market knows ex ante whether it can produce profitably. This
implies that the sunk export costs could be expressed as the amortized per
period equivalents. Instead, to model exporting uncertainty, one needs both
sunk export costs and fixed export costs. Without sunk export costs, none of
the firms that enters the export market would drop out of the export market.
Firms would never have entered, because they know their profitability in the
export market without paying any sunk cost. There also have to be fixed export
costs fx in the model to be able to account for exporting uncertainty. With CES
demand all firms face at least some demand for their variety. So, without fixed
export costs, each firm that would start exporting would continue exporting.
The existence of sunk export costs is widely discussed in the literature
(Baldwin 1988; Baldwin and Krugman 1989). Exporting is very persistent
7Also differences in productivity across markets could drive uncertainty about exporting
profitability because part of a firm’s costs are related to sales which will vary by destination
market. In a more general setup as mentioned in footnote 2, firms could be heterogeneous in
both popularity and productivity and the combined popularity and productivity could then also be
different across markets. But this does not lead to additional insights.
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Fig. 1 The different categories of firms depending on their taste parameter
implying the existence of sunk export costs. Roberts and Tybout (1997) present
empirical evidence on the existence of sunk export costs in a sample of
Colombian industries. On the existence of fixed export costs there is less
empirical work. Some other papers feature the presence of fixed exports costs
in their trade model. In particular, Venables (1994), Jean (2002), Medin (2003)
assume fixed export costs in their models.
To solve for the equilibrium of the model, three cutoff taste parameters
have to be determined, the domestic cutoff taste parameter α∗, the cutoff taste
parameter that defines the firm that just starts exporting α˘, and the exporting
cutoff taste parameter, α∗x , that determines the firm that just continues export-
ing. These three variables will be related as in Fig. 1.
There is a fraction of firms with a taste parameter below the domestic cutoff
value, which immediately exit after they tried to enter the domestic market.
There is a fraction of firms that produces only for the domestic market. There
is a fraction of firms that enters the export market but leaves immediately,
because its taste parameter is not large enough and finally there is a fraction of
firms that produces both for the domestic and the exporting market.8 From
Fig. 1 the differences with the models of Melitz (2003) and Nguyen (2008)
become clear. In Melitz (2003) firms draw α (or productivity in that model),
which is equal in the domestic and exporting market. Hence, there is no need
to draw ε to get to know the exporting popularity αx. Also, the parameter to
enter the exporting market α˘ and to be successful in the export market α∗x
are equal. In Nguyen (2008) domestic and exporting popularity α and αx are
different like in the current paper, but in Nguyen (2008) firms get to know
this productivity only by producing one period. Like in the current paper there
is also a distinction between the cutoff level to start exporting and the cutoff
8α˘ can both be larger or smaller than α∗x , depending on how stark domestic and exporting taste
parameters are correlated, which is a function of the parameter β in Eq. (14). This becomes clear
formally below in the zero profit condition for exporting, Eq. (23).
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level for successful exporting. But in Nguyen (2008) producing in one of the
markets reveals information about profitability in the other market, whereas
in the current model an additional sunk cost for the exporting market has to
be paid to find out profitability in the export market.
Solving the model requires finding the cutoff values. Given the cutoff values,
one can determine the number of firms active in the different markets from the
steady state equations and the labor market equilibrium equations. One starts















π˜x is average profit from exporting conditional upon successful entry in the










1 − H (α∗x, α˘)
∞∫
α∗x
αxh (αx, α˘) dαx (17)
h (αx, α˘) is the distribution of taste parameters in the exporting market αx
conditional upon entering the export market (and thus having a domestic taste
parameter larger than α˘) and can be found from the density functions of α,
g (α) and ε, t (ε) as follows:9










t (αx − x) dx (18)
Without fixed export costs, the cutoff taste parameter in exporting α∗x would be
equal to 0. All firms that start exporting would also continue exporting (until
they die according to the death probability δ). So, without fixed exporting costs,
there would be no exporting uncertainty.
Dividing the exporting ZCP by the domestic ZCP gives a relation between





To continue solving the model, the average profits in the two ZCP-conditions
should be added to get an equation in average profit. The latter is the
average profit conditional upon entry in the domestic market. This complicates
9Equation 18 can be derived as follows. h (αx, α˘) is the density of αx = βα + ε conditional upon









Using the rule for the density of a sum, h (αx, α˘) will be as defined in Eq. (18).
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things as the domestic taste parameter is correlated with the exporting taste
parameter. Average profit conditional upon domestic entry is given by:
π˜ = π˜d + Pr
(
α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗) [Pr (αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘) π˜x − δ fex] (20)
So, (20) says that the average profit from exports conditional upon en-
try into the domestic market is equal to the probability a firm starts ex-
porting, Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗), times the expected profits of an exporting firm,
Pr
(
αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α∗
)
π˜x − δ fex. The conditional probability in the latter term is
equal to 1 − H (α∗x, α˘).
Combining (15), (16) and (20) one can express expected profit as a function







+ 1 − G (α˘)
1 − G (α∗)
[(









The free entry equation is like in the closed economy, as defined in Eq. (13).
To find the equilibrium values a zero profit equation from exporting has to be
added, i.e. the firm with domestic taste parameter that makes zero profit from
exporting inclusive of sunk export costs should be defined. This firm’s taste
parameter α˘ is defined by the following zero expected profit condition:
Pr
(




πx | αx ≥ α∗x ∩ α = α˘
) = δ fex (22)
Equation 22 can be rewritten as follows:
Pr
(




πx | αx ≥ α∗x ∩ α = α˘
) = δ fex
Pr
(

























the expected exporting taste parameter for a firm that just






t (αx − βα˘) dαx
∞∫
α∗x
αxt (αx − βα˘) dαx =
∞∫
α∗x−βα˘
(ε + βα˘) t (ε) dαx





1 − T (α∗x − βα˘) (24)
Proposition 1 There is a unique equilibrium for α∗, α∗x, α˘ and π˜ in the model.
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Appendix 1 shows that Eqs. (13), (19), (21), and (23) lead to a unique
equilibrium for these variables. Like in the closed economy there is a steady
state of entry and exit. The number of firms producing for the domestic market
can be derived as in the closed economy from the steady state equations and




π˜ + f + Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗) [Pr (αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘) fx + δ fex]) (25)
Using Eq. (25) the number of firms can be calculated as all the cutoff parame-
ters necessary to calculate the variables on the RHS of (25) are known once
Eqs. (13), (19), (21), and (23) are solved.


































σ − 1 (26)




Nα˜ + Nxτ 1−σ α˜x
]
(27)
Nt = N + Nx (28)














4 Effects of changed trade costs
There are three types of trade costs, the iceberg trade costs τ , sunk export costs
fex and fixed export costs fx. This section discusses the effects of changes in
each of these types of trade costs on the different cutoff popularity levels α∗, α∗x ,
α˘, on the probability of entering the export market conditional upon entering
the domestic market, Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗), and on the probability of profitable
exporting conditional upon entry in the export market (success rate in the
export market), Pr
(
αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘
)
. Most results are derived analytically
10Using α˜t
α∗ = r(˜αt)r(α∗) = L/Nσ f .
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without specifying a distribution for α and ε. But some effects cannot be
determined analytically and the results from a simulation will be reported.
In the simulation a truncated normal distribution for domestic popularity α
(truncated at 0) and a normal distribution for ε are assumed. Simulation results
are robust to different choices of parameter values.11 Appendix 4 discusses the
simulation setup, the choice of baseline values and robustness checks.
The results of the first comparative statics exercise, on iceberg trade costs τ ,
are pointed out in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Lower iceberg trade costs τ lead to a higher domestic cutof f
popularity α∗ and a lower cutof f popularity for entrance into the export market
α˘ and for success in the export market α∗x.The probability of entrance into the
export market, Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗) rises with a lower τ .
Appendix 3.1 contains the proofs for these results. The effects are as
expected. Lower iceberg trade costs make exporting more profitable and
therefore the cutoff level for success in the export market α∗x declines. As a
result, the profit conditional upon successful entry, π˜ , rises. To restore the
free entry condition, Eq. (13), the probability to enter the export market
successfully thus has to decline and therefore the domestic cutoff level α∗ has
to increase.12 The cutoff level to start exporting declines with lower iceberg
trade costs, because expected profitability from exporting rises.
The probability of success in the export market, Pr
(
αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘
)
, cannot
be determined analytically. Table 1 displays the effects of changed iceberg
trade costs on the probability of exporting and the success rate of exporting
calculated from simulations using the baseline values. The probability of
success in the export market rises with lower trade costs. If a larger distance
between trading partners would exclusively affect the iceberg trade costs, this
model would imply that trade over a larger distance should have a lower
success rate. However, it is likely that distance is not only related to iceberg
trade costs, but also to fixed and sunk export costs. Next, the effects of lower
sunk export costs fex are evaluated.
Proposition 3 Lower sunk exports costs fex lead to a higher domestic cutof f
level α∗, a lower cutof f level to start exporting α˘ and a higher cutof f level for
successful entry into the export market α∗x. The probability to start exporting
rises with lower sunk export costs, but the success rate of exporting declines.
11In particular, the robustness checks consist of rerunning the simulations varying the parameters
in the model one at a time. The signs of the effects stay the same as in the simulations with the
baseline values for the parameters. Robustness with respect to distributional assumptions of α and
ε are not verified due to computational problems. So in this regard simulation results should be
treated with caution.
12As Melitz (2003) points out the mechanism driving this effect is increased competition for scarce
labor resources as a result of the increased profitability, which drives up the real wage in the
economy.
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Table 1 Simulation results of changes in trade costs
τ 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Pr (Exp) 0.69 0.36 0.14 0.03 0.00
Pr (Succ) 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.75
fex 10 11 12 13 14
Pr (Exp) 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07
Pr (Succ) 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.75
fx 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
Pr (Exp) 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.03
Pr (Succ) 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64
β 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
Pr (Exp) 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.28 0.32
Pr (Succ) 0.66 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.50
The first, fourth and seventh row show the different values of iceberg trade costs τ sunk export
costs fex and fixed export costs fx respectively. The the two rows below these rows show for each
parameter the different values of the probability of exporting and the probability of success in
the export market. The simulation for each of the parameters consist of a stepwise increase of the
parameter by 10% in each step.
Appendix 3.2 contains the proof of these results. Lower sunk export costs
raise expected profit. To restore the ex ante zero profit condition, the cutoff
cost level of both domestic and exporting production will have to increase. At
the same time it becomes cheaper to start exporting and therefore the cutoff
level to start exporting declines. The implication is that more firms start to
export, but a lower fraction of them will be successful.
Finally, the effect of lower fixed export costs fx can be calculated.
Proposition 4 Lower f ixed export costs cause a higher domestic popularity
cutof f level α∗, a lower cutof f level to start exporting α˘ and a lower cutof f level
for successful exporting α∗x. The probability to start exporting rises with lower
f ixed export costs.
The proof is in Appendix 3.3. Lower fixed export costs raise the expected
profits from exporting. This means that also less profitable firms can stay in the
export market: the cutoff level for successful exporting α∗x declines. The higher
exporting profitability also implies a lower cutoff level to start exporting α˘. The
domestic cutoff level has to rise to restore the free entry condition. As a result,
the probability to start exporting rises. The effect on the probability of success
in the exporting market cannot be determined analytically. The simulation
results reported in Table 1 make clear that the probability of success in the
exporting market increase with lower fixed export costs.
It is interesting to perform also a comparative statics analysis on β, a mea-
sure for the similarity of tastes across countries. Predictions on the probability
of exporting and the probability of export success could be easily confronted
with empirics, using the data on cultural similarity in Felbermayr and Toubal
(2010) for example. As shown in Appendix 3.4 the effect of a change in β is
ambiguous on all the cutoff levels α∗, α∗x and α˘ and thus also on the probability
of exporting and exporting success. The simulation results displayed in Table 1
Heterogeneous Popularity and Exporting Uncertainty 813
show that a larger β raises the probability of starting to export, but decreases
the probability of export success.
The effects of the different types of trade liberalizations are summarized
in Table 2. Signs with superscripted 1 are determined in simulations. The
effects of lower iceberg trade costs on the different variables are as expected.
It becomes easier to export and ex ante expected profit rises leading to a
reallocation effect that shifts up the cutoff popularity in the domestic market.
Comparing the effects of lower fixed exports costs and sunk export costs pro-
vides interesting insights. Both lead to higher ex ante expected profit leading
to more entry, more competition for scarce labor resources and therefore a
higher cutoff popularity level. But the effects on the two exporting cutoff levels
are opposite. Lower fixed exports costs decrease the cutoff level of successful
exporting and the cutoff level of entrance into the export market, whereas
lower sunk export costs lead to a higher cutoff level of successful exporting
and a lower cutoff level of export entrance. The implication is that both lower
sunk export costs and lower fixed export costs lead to a larger probability of
entrance into the export market. Instead lower fixed export costs increase the
probability of success in the export market, whereas lower sunk export costs
decrease the probability of successful exporting.
The different impact of changes in sunk and fixed export costs can be
explained as follows: lower fixed export costs make the operational profits
from exporting higher. Therefore, more firms are able to successfully export
now. Also the domestic threshold to start exporting declines, as the expected
profits are larger. Lower sunk export costs instead do not affect the operational
profits from exporting. They are paid once and do not reappear after that. Still,
ex ante expected profits rise when sunk export costs decline. This implies that
the cutoff level both for success in the domestic and the export market has to
rise to restore the free entry condition.
The implication of these effects is that the probability to enter the export
market increases for both lower fixed and sunk export costs. It becomes more
attractive to try to enter the export market. Instead the probability to have
success in the export market declines with lower sunk entry costs, because
more firms try to enter the export market, whereas the cutoff level to be
successful is higher. The probability of success in the export market rises with
lower fixed export costs. More firms try to enter the export market, but the
simulations show that the hurdle to sell profitably in the export market declines
even more, making it more likely to be successful in the export market.
Applying Eq. (29), the welfare effects of lower trade costs can be deter-
mined. The following result can be derived:
Table 2 Summary of signs of
marginal effects of changes in
trade costs on cutoff values
and exporting and exporting
success probabilities
τ fx fex
α∗ − − −
α˘ + + +
α∗x + + −
Pr (Exporting) − − −
Pr (Success) −1 −1 +
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Proposition 5 Lower iceberg trade costs τ , lower sunk export costs fex and
lower f ixed export costs fx all lead to an increase in welfare.
Lower trade costs of each of the three types lead to a higher domestic cutoff
popularity α∗. Applying Eq. (29), this implies that welfare rises in all three
cases.13 The result is remarkable for the decline in sunk export costs. Lower
sunk export costs raise the probability of entry but decrease the probability of
success in the export market. Hence, they eat away valuable resources without
leading to additional production. That welfare still rises is due to the Melitz-
type structure of the model. An increasing demand for valuable resources,
even if they do not lead to more production, is always welfare enhancing.
The higher demand for resources bids up real wages and squeezes the least
productive firms out of the market and so is actually the main driving force for
a welfare improvement.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper modeled export uncertainty due to lack of information among firms
about the popularity of their variety in the export market to explain the large
amount of firms exiting the export market shortly after entry. In other work
(by Baldwin 1988 and Irarrazabal and Opromolla 2006 for example) shocks
to variables affecting profitability like productivity are used to account for
exit from the export market. The explanation put forward in this paper is
supported by empirical work that shows that a large fraction of exit from
the export market is shortly after entry. The network view on international
trade as proposed by Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Watson (2003) provides an
alternative explanation for quick exit of firms from the export market: buyers
switch suppliers often and the old seller drops out of the export market.
The model in this paper predicts that changes in sunk export costs and
in fixed export costs have opposite effects on the probability of entry into
the export market and successful entry. Lower sunk export costs raise the
probability of entry into the export market, but decrease the rate of export
success. Lower fixed export costs raise both the probability of export entry
and the probability of export success.
Work in the present paper can be extended in various directions. Firstly, an
n-country version of the model could be used to estimate the parameters of the
model with firm-level data on exporting. Secondly, the work of Nguyen (2008)
could be combined with the current work. In such a model firms could learn
about the popularity of their variety by incurring sunk export costs, but also by
small sales. An extended model could allow for the possibility to approach a
foreign market in two ways: through market experimentation along with small-
13An implication is that total production will rise, as total production (utility U) is equal to L
divided by P.
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scale sales and through market flooding along with incurring large market
research costs, product development and marketing costs. Such a model could
generate predictions on what determines how firms enter a foreign market, for
example firm size and market size of the importing country. A third possible
extension is empirical and could try to find ways to differentiate empirically
between the tastes cum lack of information view and the network view and
between the small sales approach to enter foreign markets and the sunk cost
approach followed in this paper, which all provide an explanation for exporting
uncertainty and quick exit from the export market. Such empirical work would
require detailed firm level data which contains information on how firms enter
foreign markets, for example through import agents, through direct sales to
customers or through sales subsidiaries. The choice of certain export modes
could be related to covariates like firm size and importer market size to test
predictions from a theoretical model as mentioned above where firms have
the possibility to enter the export market in different ways.
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Appendix 1: Unique equilibrium open economy
The equilibrium in the model is found by combining Eqs. (13), (19), (21), and
(23) and solving for the three unknowns α∗, α∗x , α˘. Merging Eqs. (13) and (21)













) = δ fex (32)
With j (α), jx (αx, α˘) and ix (αx, α˘) defined as:



















Uniqueness of the equilibrium is shown as follows. Equations 30–32 are log
differentiated with respect to the three unknowns α∗, α˘ and α∗x . Variables with
a hat will indicate relative changes. It will become clear that (30) and (31) are
independent of the level of α˘. The log differentiation of (30) is then substituted
into (31) to show that the LHS of (31) rises monotonically in α∗. This implies
a unique solution. The log differentiation of (32) makes clear that there is a
unique corresponding value of α˘.
Log differentiating Eqs (30) and (31) with respect to α∗, α˘ and α∗x gives:

















α˘̂˘α = 0 (34)











jx (αx, α˘) + (1 − H (αx, α˘))
]
< 0. The derivation is similar to the deriva-
tion in Appendix B of Melitz (2003) and available upon request. Furthermore,
it can be proved that the two terms in ̂˘α cancel each other out. The derivation
is lengthy but straightforward and available upon request. Therefore, using
Eq. (33), Eq. (34) can be rewritten as:
− f [ j (α∗)+(1−G (α∗))] α̂∗−(1−G (α˘)) fx[ jx (α∗x, α˘)+(1−H (α∗x, α˘))] α̂∗x =0
(35)
Equation 35 shows that the LHS of (31) is monotonically increasing in α∗.
Furthermore it can be shown that lim
α→0
j (α) = ∞. This implies a unique solution
for α∗ and α∗x .
Log differentiating Eq. (32) with respect to α∗x and α˘ gives the following
expression (derivation available upon request):
(





) + (1 − T (α∗x − βα˘))] α̂∗x = 0 (36)
Equation 36 shows α˘ that rises monotonically in α∗x implying a unique equi-
librium value for α˘ corresponding to the equilibrium value α∗x . Eq. (36)) can










1 − T (α∗x − βα˘)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ α̂∗x (37)
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Appendix 2: Derivation number of firms
Labor can be allocated to four different tasks, domestic production, domestic
entry, exporting production and exporting entry listed in this sequence in
Eq. (38):
L = Lp + Le + Lp,x + Le,x (38)
The labor market equilibria for production in the domestic and exporting
markets are defined as:
Lp = Nr˜d − Nπ˜d (39)
Lp,x = Nx˜rx − Nxπ˜x (40)
N and Nx are the number of firms producing for respectively the domestic and
the exporting market. The labor market equilibria for market exploration to
enter the domestic market and the exporting market are given respectively by:
Le = fe Ne (41)
Le,x = fex Ne,x (42)
Ne and Ne,x are the number of firms trying to enter the domestic market and
the export market, respectively. Entry and exit on both the domestic and the
exporting market has to be equal in steady state. This implies:
Ne Pr (α ≥ α∗) = δN (43)
Ne,x Pr
(
αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘
) = δNx (44)
Adding the four labor market equilibrium conditions, i.e. substituting
Eqs. (39)–(44) into Eq. (38), gives:
L = Nr˜d − Nπ˜d + Nπ˜ + Nx˜rx − Nxπ˜x + fexδNx
Pr
(




r˜d − π˜d + π˜ + NxN
(
r˜x − π˜x + fexδ
Pr
(














rd+ 1 − G (α˘)1−G (α∗)
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) r˜x
)
= Nr˜ = Ntr (˜αt) (45)
818 E. Bekkers
α˜t and Nt are defined in Eqs. (27) and (28). Average revenues in Eq. (45)









1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) fx)) (46)
Appendix 3: Effect of changed trade costs
This appendix derives the effects of changes in the three types of trade costs
τ , fx and fex on the three cutoff values α∗, α∗x , α˘ and on the probabili-
ties of exporting and the success rate of exporting, Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗) and
Pr
(
αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘
)
respectively. ηy,x indicates the elasticity of y with respect
to x.
Appendix 3.1: Changed iceberg trade costs
Equations 30–22 can be log differentiated with respect to τ , α∗, α∗x , α˘. Only
(30) contains τ , so the log differentiated equations of (31) and (22) are given
in Eqs. (35) and (37) respectively. The log differentiation of (30) becomes:
α̂∗x = (σ − 1) τ̂ + α̂∗ (47)
Combining Eqs. (47), (35) and (37), one can solve for α̂∗, ̂˘α and α̂∗x as a
function τ̂ :
α̂∗ = −
(σ − 1) fx
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x τ̂
α̂∗x =
(σ − 1) f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x τ̂
̂˘α = αˇx
βα˘
(σ − 1) f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x τ̂
Hence, ηα∗,τ < 0, ηα∗x ,τ > 0 and ηα˘,τ > 0. The probability of exporting and the




α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗) = −g (α˘) α˘̂˘α + g (α∗)α∗α̂∗ (48)
d ln Pr
(
αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘
)
= −h (α∗x, α˘)α∗x α̂∗x + g (α˘)1−G (α˘)
((
1−H (α∗x, α˘)) − (1−T (α∗x − βα˘)))̂˘α (49)
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Notice that in Eq. (49),
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) ≥ (1 − T (α∗x − βα˘)), because the prob-
ability of successful exporting is larger for firms with a larger domestic taste
parameter. Substituting the relative changes in cutoff parameters into Eqs. (48)
and (49) shows that lower iceberg trade costs leads to a larger probability of
exporting. The sign of the effect on the success rate of exporting cannot be
determined:
∂ ln Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗)
∂ ln τ







αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘
)
∂ ln τ
= −h (α∗x, α˘)α∗xηα∗x ,τ + g (α˘)1 − G (α˘)
((
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) − (1 − T (α∗x − βα˘))) ηα˘,τ
Appendix 3.2: Changed sunk export costs
Equations 30–32 can be log differentiated with respect to α∗, α∗x , α˘ and fex. The
log differentiation of Eq. (30) is given by (33). The log differentiations of (31)
and (32) are given respectively by:
− f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗
α̂∗x − fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x α̂∗x
− (1 − G (α˘)) δ fex f̂ex = 0 (50)
fx
(
1 − F (α∗x − βα˘)) βα˘α∗x ̂˘α − fx
(
1 − F (α∗x − βα˘)) αˇxα∗x α̂∗x = δ fex f̂ex (51)
Solving for α̂∗, α̂∗x and ̂˘α from Eqs. (33), (50) and (51) generates:
α̂∗ = α̂∗x =
(1 − G (α˘)) δ fex
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x f̂ex (52)
̂˘α = f (1−G (α∗)) α˜α∗ + fx(1−G (α˘))
[(




1−T(α∗x −βα˘)) βα˘δ fexα∗x
[
f (1−G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx (1−G (α˘))
(
1−H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x
] f̂ex
(53)
Equations 52 and 53 show that −1 < ηα∗, fex = ηα∗x , fex < 0 and ηα˘, fex > 0. Using
Eqs. (48) and (49) this implies that the probability of exporting rises with lower
sunk export costs whereas the success rate of exporting declines:
∂ ln Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗)
∂ ln fex








αx ≥ α∗x | α ≥ α˘
)
∂ ln fex
= −h (α∗x, α˘)α∗xηα∗x , fex + g (α˘)1−G (α˘)
((
1−H (α∗x, α˘))−(1−T (α∗x −βα˘))) ηα˘, fex >0
Appendix 3.3: Changed fixed export costs
Equations 30–32 can be log differentiated with respect to α∗, α∗x , α˘ and fx. This
generates the following three equations:
α̂∗x = f̂x + α̂∗ (54)
− f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗
α̂∗ − fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x α̂∗x




f̂x = 0 (55)
(
1 − F (α∗x − βα˘)) βα˘α∗x ̂˘α −
(
1 − T (α∗x − βα˘)) αˇxα∗x α̂∗x + δ fex f̂x = 0 (56)
Solving for α̂∗ and α̂∗x from Eqs. (54) and (55) leads to:
α̂∗ = − fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘))
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x f̂x (57)
α̂∗x =
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) [ α˜xα∗x − 1
]
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x f̂x (58)
And from (56) and (58), ̂˘α can be calculated:
̂˘α = α∗x
βα˘
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜x−αˇxα∗x
f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗ + fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x f̂x
Hence, −1 < ηα∗, fx < 0, 0 < ηα∗x , fx < 1 and ηα˘, fx > 0. This implies, using (48)
and (49), that the probability to start exporting rises, whereas the effect
on the success rate of exporting cannot be determined without specifying a
distribution of taste parameters:
∂ ln Pr (α ≥ α˘ | α ≥ α∗)
∂ ln fx
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∂ln Pr
(
αx ≥α∗x | α≥ α˘
)
∂ ln fx




1−H (α∗x, α˘))−(1−T (α∗x −βα˘))) ηα˘, fx <0
Appendix 3.4: Changed similarity parameter β
Equations 30–32 can be log differentiated with respect to α∗, α∗x , α˘ and β. Log
differentiating Eq. (30) leads to (33). Log differentiating Eqs. (31) and (32)
generates respectively:
− f (1 − G (α∗)) α˜
α∗
α̂∗ − fx (1 − G (α˘))
(
1 − H (α∗x, α˘)) α˜xα∗x α̂∗x (59)




























1 − T (α∗x − βα˘)) βα˘α∗x ̂˘α −
(
1 − T (α∗x − βα˘)) αˇxα∗x α̂∗x +
(
1 − T (α∗x − βα˘)) βα˘α∗x β̂
(60)














































































Because the numerator of the coefficient in Eq. (61) contains a positive,
a negative and an ambiguous term, the sign of the effect of β on α∗ and α∗x
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cannot be determined. As a result also the sign of the effect on α˘ cannot be
determined.
Appendix 4: Simulations
To get some insight in the effects of changes in trade costs whose sign cannot
be determined analytically, the model is solved numerically. Equations 13,
19, 21, and 23 have to be solved for α∗, α∗x , α˘ and π˜ . The philosophy behind
choosing the baseline parameter values is in line with the choice of parameters
in the numerical analysis of Bernard et al. (2007). Baseline parameter values
and the corresponding values of the endogenous variables are displayed in
Table 3.
The elasticity of substitution σ is set at 3.8 following estimates using plant-
level US manufacturing data in Bernard et al. (2003). The parameter value of
the sunk entry cost fe scales the mass of firms and without loss of generality
fe is set at 10. Fixed production costs, domestically and in the foreign market,
f and fx respectively, are 10% of the sunk entry cost, 1. The domestic and
exporting fixed costs are equal in the baseline, implying an equal domestic
and exporting cutoff taste parameter in the case of zero iceberg trade costs.
The death probability δ rescales the mass of entrants relative to the mass of
producing firms and without loss of generality, a value of 0.025 is chosen.
Marginal cost a and market size L do not affect the solution of the endogenous
variables and just rescale the price index P. a is set at 0.5 and L at 100. Iceberg
trade costs τ are set equal to 1.2, the case with iceberg trade costs equal to 1
would not be an interesting benchmark.
The parameter indicating the relation between CES weights β and the
standard deviation of α and ε together determine the correlation between
domestic and exporting taste parameters. With a choice of β = 0.5, σα = 2 and
Table 3 Baseline simulation: chosen parameters and results endogenous variables
Baseline parameters Endogenous variables
Marginal costs a 0.5 Domestic cutoff value α∗ 1.01
Fixed costs f 1 Cutoff to start exporting α˘ 3.46
Fixed export costs fx 1 Cutoff successful exporting α∗x 1.69
Sunk entry costs fe 10 Prob. to start exporting Pr(Exp) 0.14
Sunk export costs fex 10 Prob. successful exporting Pr (Succ) 0.66
Iceberg trade costs τ 1.2 Average popularity α˜t 1.42
Death probability δ 0.025 Number of domestic firms N 17
Substitution elasticity σ 3.8 Number of exporting firms Nx 2
Cultural similarity β 0.5 Price index P 0.21
Standdev alpha σα 2 Average profit π˜ 0.41
Standdev epsilon σε 1
Number of workers L 100
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= √2/3. Finally, the level of sunk export costs affects the cutoff
parameter to start exporting and without loss of generality, a baseline value of
5 is chosen.
For ε the simulations are run with a normal distribution, because it is the
most logical distribution for a variable that should have mean zero and range
from minus infinity to plus infinity. Using convolution the distribution of αx,
which consists of the distribution of the sum of α and ε, can be determined. In
R integrals do not converge applying convolution with different distributions
for the different variables α and ε (for example Pareto for α and Normal for ε).
Therefore, it is assumed that α also has a normal distribution, though truncated
from below at zero to rule out negative taste parameter values. This implies
though that the simulation results should be treated with caution with respect
to robustness to distributional assumptions.
The results of the simulation exercise are displayed in Table 1. Starting
from the baseline value, the three different types of trade costs are five times
increased by 10% to address the effect of changes in these variables on the
probability of exporting and the probability of success in the export market.
A set of robustness checks is performed. The results of the robustness checks
are not displayed due to space limitations, but are available upon request.14
The robustness checks consist of rerunning the comparative statics exercises
varying the parameters f , fx, fe, fex, τ , δ, σ , β, σα and σε one at a time. The
results in the main text carry through in the robustness analysis, so the signs of
effects of changes in trade costs and β stay the same.
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